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Abstract:
Much research has implied that social capital functions as an XQTXDOLILHG³SXEOLFJRRG´
enhancing governance, economic performance, and quality of life (Coleman 1988; Cohen and
Arato 1992; Putnam 1993; Cohen and Rogers 1995). Scholars of disaster (Nakagawa and Shaw
2004; Adger et al. 2005; Dynes 2005; Tatsuki 2008) have extended this concept to posit that
social capital provides nonexcludable benefits to whole communities after major crises. Using
qualitative methods to analyze data from villages in Tamil Nadu, India following the 2004 Indian
Ocean tsunami, this paper demonstrates that high levels of social capital simultaneously provided
strong benefits and equally strong negative externalities, especially to those already on the
periphery of society. In these villages, high levels of social capital reduced barriers to collective
action for members of the uur panchayats (hamlet councils) and parish councils, speeding up
their recovery and connecting them to aid organizations, but at the same time reinforced
obstacles to recovery for women, Dalits, migrants, and Muslims. These localized findings have
important implications for academic studies of social capital and policy formation for future
disasters and recovery schemes.
Keywords: social capital, disaster recovery, caste, Indian Ocean tsunami
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Not long after the devastating 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, observers noticed that
similarly damaged villages on the southeast coast of India had very different patterns of recovery.
One scholar described how, when relief workers arrived on the scene of a damaged village,
UDWKHUWKDQEHLQJPHWE\³YLFWLPVLQVKRFN´WKH\ZHUHPHWE\WKHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVRIWKHQRQgovernmental fisher caste councils, who handed over carefully prepared lists of their casualties,
damage, and needs (Bavinck 2008: 76). This self-organized, coordinated response to crisis stood
was in stark contrast to the frustration and anger expressed by another hamlet nearby which felt
left out of the aid framework. ³2QHRIRXUPHQKDVFRPPLWWHGVXLFLGHEHFDXVHKHQHYHUJRWDQ\
response to his request to re-start the small business he lost in the tsunami. We also are frustrated
that the government never replies to our requests to replace the tools and handcarts we need to go
back to work. We also are considering suicide´ (quoted in Gill 2007: 6). What accounts for this
variation in recovery?
This article uses case studies of hamlets and villages1 in Tamil Nadu, India after the 2004
Indian Ocean tsunami to investigate the effect of varying levels of social resources on postdisaster outcomes. Based on site visits, interviews with local residents and NGO leaders, and an
analysis of secondary and tertiary materials, the article argues that villages with high levels of
bonding and linking social capital received greater amounts of aid and assistance more quickly
than communities which possessed only bonding capital. However, while villages more tightly
linked to outside organizations experienced better post-disaster recovery, minorities, outcastes,
and nonmembers in those hamlets were often excluded from the assistance process. That is,
hamlets which overcame collective action problems and efficiently extracted resources from
donors and government officials also left out tsunami-affected villagers on the social margins of
society. Through links to external agencies, coordinated villages with uur panchayat (hamlet or
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fisher council) leadership were able to transmit their interests and needs, while at the same time
pushing aside those residents on the periphery. Based on the experiences of these villages in
which governance institutions serving as connectors to outside agencies engaged in caste-based
discrimination, future scholarship on disaster recovery must not overlook the negative
externalities that can accompany strong social networks. The negative externalities illuminated
here include exclusion from organized relief efforts and discrimination against nonmembers in a
variety of institutional settings.
,WKDVEHFRPHVRPHWKLQJRID³VHOIHYLGHQWWUXWK´ 2VWURP that social capital
functions primarily or solely as a ³public good´ (Coleman 1988; Cohen and Arato 1992; Putnam
1993; Cohen and Rogers 1995), that is, a resource which provides nonexcludable benefits, so
that all residents of a high social capital neighborhood enjoy its positive side effects. More
broadly, many researchers envision WKDW³DUREXVWVWURQJDQGYLEUDQWFLYLOVRFLHW\VWUHQJWKHQV
DQGHQKDQFHVOLEHUDOGHPRFUDF\´ &KDPEHUVDQG.RSVWHLQ 6RFLDOVFLHQWLVWVstudying
disaster have applied this logic to argue that high levels of social capital speed up post-disaster
recovery for communities affected by crisis (Nakagawa and Shaw 2004; Dynes 2005; Tatsuki
2008). In a widely cited article (Adger et al. 2005: 1038) the authors claim that social capital has
DUROHLQ³buffering the effects of extreme natural hazards and promoting social reorganization´
7KLVDUWLFOHRIIHUVDPRUHQXDQFHGYLHZRIVRFLDOFDSLWDO¶VUROHLQGLVDVWHUUHFRYHU\UHFRJQL]LQJ
LWDVD³-DQXV-IDFHG´UHVRXUFH(Szreter 2002) which brings both benefits and costs; social
networks bring about different policy and governance outcomes for groups within the
mainstream than those at the periphery. This article focuses on collective outcomes for villages
and hamlets, not individual recoveries; it is possible to find positive individual recoveries for
residents even in low social capital areas and vice versa.
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This article first describes the relevant literature on the role of social capital in recovery,
lays out the context for the study, and identifies the data and methodology used in the analysis.
It then investigates villages with varying levels of social capital to check their post-tsunami
recovery levels, discusses the results of this analysis, and concludes with policy
recommendations and suggestions for researchers based on these findings.
L iterature Review: Social C apital in Disaster Recovery
Definitions for social capital ± introduced to social scientists by James Coleman (1988)
and later popularized by Robert Putnam (1993, 1995, 2000) ± vary, but for this study its core
elements revolve around the ³QHWZRUNVQRUPVDQGVRFLDOWUXVWWKDWIDFLOLWDWHFRRUGLQDWLRQDQG
cooperation for mutXDOEHQHILW´ 3XWQDP 3HUKDSVWKHPRVWVXFFLQFWDQGIRFXVHG
explanation comes from Lin (2008: 51) who defined social capital as ³resources embedded in
RQH¶VVRFLDOQHWZRUNVUHVRXUFHVWKDWFDQEHDFFHVVHGRUPRELOL]HGWKURXJKWLHVLQWKHQHWZRUNV´
$QLQGLYLGXDO¶VVRFLDOQHWZRUNVVHWKLVRUKHUWUXVWOHYHOV WKDWLVZKHWKHUPHPEHUVRIWKH
network are assumed to carry out their obligations and obey norms) and expectations of
reciprocity (if acts of kindness are to be repaid and if individuals are expected to free ride or not)
(Coleman 1988). Higher amounts of social capital allow groups to overcome the typical barriers
to collective action which regularly stymie mobilization (Olson 1965). For example, villages in
India with higher levels of social capital and active leadership displayed better performance in
the field of economic development, community peace, and democratic participation (Krishna
2002), while regions in Italy with higher levels of social capital displayed more responsive
governance and stronger economic growth (Putnam 1993).    
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Research has identified three distinct forms of social capital: bonding, bridging, and
linking. Bonding social capital grows from organizations and activities connecting similar
individuals who often live in close proximity to each other (cf. Schuller, Baron, and Field 2000).
Putnam (2000: 22) sees bonding social capital as ³XQGHUJLUGLQJVSHFLILFUHFLSURFLW\DQG
PRELOL]LQJVROLGDULW\´DPRQJKRPRJHQHRXVLQGLYLGXDOVDQG:RROFRFN  VLPLODUO\
GHILQHVLWLQWHUPVRIUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQ³IDPLO\PHPEHUVFORVHIULHQGVDQGQHLJKERUV´This
type of social connection often links individuals already very similar to each other in terms of
race, ethnicity, or religion. SRFLDOVFLHQWLVWVWHUPWKLVFRQGLWLRQ³KRPRSKLO\´DQGLWH[SODLQVZK\
our informal networks for recreation and leisure are often quite similar to us. Research on social
ties has confirmed the long-held intuition that homogeneity brings with it higher levels of social
capital, while ethnic diversity does the opposite (Leigh 2006). One large-N study of 41
communities across the United States showed that inter-racial trust and trust of neighbors was
highest where ethnic homogeneity was highest; alternatively, higher levels of diversity brought
about lower levels of engagement and social capital (Putnam 2007). Another survey on 307
)OHPLVKWRZQVIRXQGWKDW³PXQLFLSDOities with a more heterogeneous population indeed have
lower levels of socLDOFDSLWDO´ &RIIH %URDGO\VSHDNLQJPRUHKRPRJHQRXVORFDOLWLHV
are most likely to have higher levels of civic participation, trust, and bonding social capital
(Alesina and La Ferrara 2000).

Bridging social capital LQFRQWUDVWLQYROYHV³OLQNDJHWRH[WHUQDODVVHWV´DQGJHQHUDWHV
³EURDGHULGHQWLWLHV´ 3XWQDP E\connecting individuals across typical cleavages.
Bridging activities and organizations bring together individuals from different neighborhoods,
ethnicities, and races (Schuller, Baron, and Field 2000). Varshney (2001), for example,
documented how inter-ethnic trade unions, political parties, sports clubs, and other organizations
5
  

brought together Hindus and Muslims in India and dampened social conflict between them.
Parent-Teacher Associations in the United States bring together parents of various ethnic
backgrounds and religions, as do public schools. Where bonding social capital reinforced
obvious affinities between residents, bridging social capital can connect diverse individuals.
Szereter and Woolcock (2004: 655) discuss a third type ± linking social capital ± that is
FRPSRVHGRI³QRUPVRIUHVSHFWDQGQHWZRUNVRIWUXVWLQJUHODWLRQVKLSVEHWZHHQSHRSOe who are
interacting across explicit, formal or institutionalized power or authority gradients in society.´
Where bridging social capital connects individuals of more-or-less equal social status, linking
social capital connects those of unequal status, providing them with access to power. Linking
social capital brings together citizens with decision makers and leaders who hold positions of
authority and can distribute often scarce resources. For example, most villagers living in hamlets
in southeast India never interact directly with government officials or NGO representatives
(Interviews, February 2008). After the tsunami, though, some caste councils developed direct
connections to outside organizations, including independent aid agencies, international NGOs,
and civil servants within the Indian government. Both in India and abroad, disaster survivors
able to access such non-local authority figures had measurably better recoveries than those
without such extended networks (Beggs, Haines, and Hurlbert 1996; Wetterberg 2005).
More broadly, research has generally linked higher levels of social capital to better postcrisis outcomes. For example, an investigation of the role of village social ties in Indonesia
GXULQJWKH$VLDQILQDQFLDOFULVLVVKRZHGWKDW³certain types of social ties are indeed a sort of
capital for the poor, who are able to use their relationships as a way of improving well-EHLQJ´
(Wetterberg 2005: 1). Nakagawa and Shaw (2004)  argued that localities with higher levels of
social capital demonstrated better recovery following earthquakes in India and Japan. Dynes
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(2005) has suggested, based on experiences of survivors in a number of disasters, that social
capital may be the basis for resilience (the ability to recover from trauma and crisis), as it
provides information and resources at critical junctures. Adger et al (2005: 1038) claim that
³VWURQJORFDOVRFLDOFRKHVLRQDQGPHFKDQLVPVIRUFROOHFWLYHDFWLRQKDYHDOO enhanced resilience´
in post-tsunami Indonesia. Similarly, strong social ties among coastal dwellers in the Andaman
and Nicobar Islands enabled rapid in-group assistance to tsunami-DIIHFWHGFKLOGUHQ³7KHVRFLDO
capital of the tuhets [joint family] is so strong that there is no need for any external aid agencies
to assist orphaned children from any tribal community´ *XSWDDQG6KDUPD 
Neighborhoods and villages with wider and denser networks implement faster recoveries
following a disaster for three reasons. First, strong VRFLDOWLHVFDQVHUYHDV³LQIRUPDOLQVXUDQFH´
allowing victims to draw upon ready-made support networks for financial, physical, and logistic
guidance (Beggs, Haines, and Hurlbert 1996). Similarly, ³[a]ctors who have connections outside
their immediate community are likely to be better off, as they can draw on these links when local
resources are insufficient or unavailable´(Wetterberg 2005: 7). More broadly, information and
signals from civil society ± VXFKDV³ZKRLVFRPLQJEDFNZKHQDQGZKDWVHUYLFHVZLOOEH
SURYLGHG´± are critical to decision-making processes of survivors, and cannot be replaced by
government pronouncements (Chamlee-Wright and Rothschild 2007: 2). Social networks thus
provide essential information, support, and guidance through strong and weak ties (Granovetter
1973).
Second, organized communities can better mobilize and overcome barriers to collective
action (Olson 1965). Neighbors with greater levels of trust share information about bureaucratic
procedures and upcoming deadlines, monitor public space to prevent dumping, and deter looting
in their community. Following the 1995 Kobe earthquake, for example, local residents in some
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neighborhoods organized to cooperative, fireproof housing while other areas waited for guidance
from city officials (Olshansky, forthcoming). As DeFilippis (2001) has argued, social capital can
assist individuals in attracting and controlling resources, as better organized and mobilized
regions can more successfully access the loans, supplies, and other resources (Dow 1999).
Finally, social neWZRUNVUDLVHWKHFRVWRI³H[LW´IURPDFRPPXQLW\DQGLQFUHDVHWKH
probability that residHQWVZLOOXVH³YRLFH´ (Hirschman 1970). Deeper social ties act as a barrier
to exit ± one of the potential responses to a crisis - and make it more likely that residents who are
embedded in the community will work for a solution. Areas with softer voices - those plagued
by weak community ties - will rebuild more slowly, if they rebuild at all (Kamel and LoukaitouSideris 2004). Citizens bound by fewer ties to their neighbors are more likely to engage in
illegal and disruptive acts which can impede recovery efforts (Varshney 2001; Lee and
Bartkowski 2004).
However, scholars who envision social capital solely as a nonexcludable resource which
provides positive benefits to all may have overlooked its accompanying externalities, including
the ³H[FOXVLRQRIRXWVLGHUV´ (Wetterberg 2005: 4). Some have seen the foundational work of
3XWQDP  DQG&ROHPDQ  DVRYHUSOD\LQJWKH³SXEOLFJRRG´DVSHFWRI
social capital without fully acknowledging its costs (Berman 1997; Chambers and Kopstein
2001). Strong bonds between members of an in-group, for example, may reinforce hatred and
xenophobia and facilitate destructive action so that denser social capital contributes to criminal
activity directed at outsiders (Nagar and Rethemeyer 2007). Further, during post-Katrina
recovery in New Orleans, Louisiana, neighborhoods with higher levels of bonding social capital
mobilized to block recovery plans ± a tactic which they believed benefited their blocks but which
slowed the process of recovery as a whole (Aldrich and Crook 2008). This article builds on the
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observation that strong social capital can bring ZLWKLWD³SDUDGR[´ )ROH\DQG(GZDUGV 
in-group participants gain more resilience to shocks and better coordinate their recovery efforts
but out-group residents find themselves further on the periphery.
Given that social capital does not manifest itself in the same form across time and
societies, its measurement must be sensitive to the historical period and cultural environment
under investigation (Krishna 2007: 944-945). Serra (2001) argued that standard Western
measures of social capital, such as those used by Putnam in his 1993 study of northern and
southern Italy - including literacy, voter turnout, and membership in horizontal associations ± did
not map well onto the empirical realities of Indian states. Krishna (2003: 9) similarly argued that
PHDVXUHVZKLFKFDSWXUHWKH³GHQVLW\RIIRUPDORUJDQL]DWLRQV´ZRXOG EH³SDUWLFXODUO\
LQDSSURSULDWHIRU5DMDVWKDQYLOODJHV´,QVWHDG6HUUD  SRVLWHGWKDWLQ,QGLD³NLQVKLS
WLHVRU«FDVWHDQGUHOLJLRQZKLFKSURYLGHYLWDOVXSSRUWWRLQGLYLGXDOV´EHVWUHIOHFWVRFLDO
resources. This article focuses on local caste or hamlet councils (known as uur panchayats in
Tamil) as a critical, institutionalized source of social capital on the southeast Indian coast. Uur

panchayats are distinct from the formal gram panchayats, which are the lowest tier of the
subnational governance bodies established by the government. Where gra m panchayats serve as
the locus for local government in small villages and towns throughout India and exist at the
village, block, and district levels, uur panchayats are hamlet-level councils structured by caste
and occupation most commonly found in fishing villages (Bavinck 2001, 2008). These
nongovernmental organizations reinforce existing caste- and occupation-ties.
Villages in post-tsunami Tamil Nadu which were governed by caste councils regularly
held higher levels of both bonding and linking social capital, while unorganized hamlets may
have had similar levels of bonding social capital but displayed far lower levels of linking
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connections. These uur panchayats reinforced existing ties between same-caste members and
governed villages from a gendered, caste perspective, often excluding women, outcastes, and
minorities from participation and distribution. Table 1 below lays out examples of the
interactions between these two types of social resources based on the cases discussed throughout
the article.
[Table 1 about here]
Two core mechanisms, then, could increase the success of recovery efforts post-disaster.
First, deep reservoirs of bonding social capital create tightly knit support networks and the ability
to overcome collective problems. Such connections ± which can bring information and local
assistance - are most likely in localities with long term residents and caste homogeneity, such as
Dalit villages and uur panchayat-led ones. The second mechanism involves translocal
connections to NGOs and government agencies; such links help survivors and villages more
quickly and easily acquire often scarce resources post-crisis from beyond their typical reach. In
the handful of villages under study here, hamlets led by uur panchayats benefited from both
mechanisms after the tsunami, but minorities, women, and other peripheral groups in those towns
often lost out during the aid distribution process because of their lack of translocal connections.
Dalit villages and other localities without links to the outside world had only bonding social
capital to assist them in their recovery process, while mixed-caste coastal villages lacked both
bonding and linking social capital.
Context for the Study
Two massive underwater earthquakes off the coast of Sumatra on the morning of 26
December 2004 ± measured at 9.0 and 7.3 respectively - generated tsunami waves which reached
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as far as Africa (Arya, Mandal, and Muley 2006: 52). The enormous waves crashed down on
coastal villages in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Thailand, and Myanmar (Sheth, Sanyal, Jaiswal,
and Gandhi 2006: S439). Speaking about his experience in Sri Lanka, Dayalan Sanders
GHVFULEHG³a massive 30 foot wall of sea«it was like a thousand freight trains charging at you,
that thunderous roar LWVHOISHWULILHG\RXZLWKIHDU´(quoted in Bindra 2005: 29). Across Asia,
more than 200,000 people lost their lives. In southeast India, the 13 coastal districts in the state
of Tamil Nadu suffered the worst effects, with approximately 8,000 people killed by the waves
(REDS 2006: 13). 6,000 residents were killed in the district of Nagapattinam and 817 and 606
died in Kanyakumari and Cuddalore districts, respectively (Arya, Mandal, and Muley 2006: 53;
UN Team for Recovery Support 2005: 3).
As in past disasters, the tsunami affected vulnerable demographic groups most severely,
with women and children comprising most of the casualties (United Nations Team for Tsunami
Recovery Support 2007: 9). Fishing communities sustained the largest losses of lives and
property loss due to their location on the coast (Alexander 2006: 8). Surveys showed that more
than 60 percent of families in the area perceived they had lost a quarter or more of their income,
while one in five families reported that they lost between three-quarters and all of it (Fritz
Institute 2005: 4). The roughly 2000 kilometers of coastal area in southeast India accounted for
85 percent of the damage (Salagrama 2006b: 5) as more than half of these villages sit within 200
meters of the shore (Rodriguez, Balasubramanian, Shiny, Duraiswamy and Jaiprakash 2008: 18).
Along with coastal roads, bridges, and ports, more than 150,000 homes were demolished by the
force of the waves (United Nations, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank 2006: 8) with
$1.3 billion in property and asset losses. The tsunami destroyed or damaged 80,000 fishing boats,
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killed 32,000 livestock animals, and damaged and salinated close to 40,000 hectares of
agricultural land (OSGSETR 2005: 7).
The government of India acted as quickly as possible to both resettle survivors and
provide them with adequate food, shelter, and medical treatment. Rushed evacuation procedures
resulted in the random placement of many survivors in temporary shelters and villages where
they had few, if any connections (see Aldrich forthcoming). In interviews, survivors described
KRZWKH\ZHUHUDQGRPO\DVVLJQHGWRWHPSRUDU\VKHOWHUVDQGWKDW³people were placed with
people of different communities´(Case 7, Tata Institute 2007). $VRQHVXUYLYRUUHSRUWHG³>P@y
old neighbors are not nearby, they are in the locality but far from my house. It was a lottery to
choose locations for houses´ ,QWHUYLHZ20 February 2008). This disaster recovery policy brings
with it important implications for social networks; I will return to discuss this issue at the end of
the article.
Damage across the southeast coast of India varied by geography ± villages and hamlets in
alluvial delta regions, such as Akkaraipettai in Tamil Nadu, experLHQFHG³PD[LPXPZDYH
KHLJKWV´ and were often wiped out (Sheth, Sanyal, Jaiswal, and Gandhi 2006: S440) while areas
further inland or protected by sand dunes often escaped unscathed. Some coastal Indian villages
received telephone calls from relatives in cities warning them of the impending wave, but could
not always able to act upon it in time (Case 7 and Case 12, Tata Institute 2007). Beyond
escaping harm, certain communities in the Tamil Nadu area affected by the waves have
recovered more quickly than others with similar levels of damage (Author site visits, February
2008). More specifically, some villages brought in large amounts of financial assistance, NGO
donations, new housing stock, and attention, while others seemed left out of the recovery process.
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In a survey of 63 villages affected by the tsunami, Dalit, outcaste, and nonmember
victims in 16 percent of the villages ± a group of roughly 7800 people - were eligible for relief
but did not receive it in part or at all due to discrimination by gatekeepers (data from Louis 2005:
2, 6-7). Other reports claim that residents in more than 80 percent of villages, Dalits and other
groups encountered discrimination in compensation procedures (Gill 2007: 30). In some
villages Dalit families were forced out of communal temporary shelters and their children were
made to eat in separate locations from the other students (Gill 2007: 12). In one case, an elderly
Dalit woman lost her husband to the tsunami but received nothing due to the gate keeping
measures of the local panchayat. When two Dalit families in her village sought to stand in line
to receive assistance, they were beaten and driven away (Case 43, Tata Institute 2007).
In another village, an NGO sought to provide a young widow with a new house posttsunami, but she was told by council leaders that ³LIWKHSDQFKD\DWGHFLGHGWKDWVLQJOHZRPHQ
will not be given a house then she has tRKDQGLWRYHUWRWKHSDQFKD\DW´)XUWKHUSXUVXLQJKHU
FODLPWRKHURZQKRXVHVKHZDVWROGWKDW³VLQJOHZRPHQGRQ¶W QHHGODUJHKRXVHVOLNHWKDW´(Case
Study 2, Tata Institute 2007). In a different case where the tsunami had killed both parents in a
KRXVHKROGDQGDJUDQGPRWKHUWRRNRYHUWKHLUFDUH³no attempt was made to collect information
on their circumstances for WKHSXUSRVHRIDLGGLVWULEXWLRQ´GXHWRWKHJHQGHUDQGDJHRIWKH
primary caregiver (Help Age International 2005: 7). Widows and women in marginal economic
positions, such as dried fish vendors, were also denied compensation (Gomathy 2006c: 235) in
what VRPHFDOOHGD³GRXEOHGHSULYDWLRQ´GXHWREHORQJLQJWR³DVRFLDOO\GHSULYHGJURXS´ZLWK
³lHVVHUDFFHVVWRSXEOLFVHUYLFHV«DQGHQWLWOHPHQWV´ 6KDUPD (YHQZKHQDLGKDVEHHQ
SURYLGHGWRWKHFRPPXQLW\DVDZKROHWKHVHPHDVXUHVKDYH³PDGHOLWWOHLPSDFWRQ«'alit
IDPLOLHV´ (Dorairaj 2005). Migrants too faced difficulties in being listed for assistance or
13
  

receiving aid through the uur panchayats. Because the council saw them as non members, ³RQO\
281 families out of 420 have been enumerated for post-tsunami relief´(Gomathy 2006c: 233).
Parish priests and councils, like their uur panchayat counterparts, worked as
LQWHUPHGLDULHVEHWZHHQYLOODJHUVDQG1*2VVRWKDW³>L@nformation from the parish priest and
panchayat, not GLUHFWLQIRUPDWLRQZDVWDNHQ´by relief organizations (Case 7, Tata Institute
2007). In areas like Kanyakumari, residents complained that only families active in Catholic
&KXUFKDFWLYLWLHV³benefited from the economic, social and educational opportunities made
DYDLODEOH´ REDS 2006: 29). In another village, families which did not engage in Churchsanctioned educational procedures found themselves excluded from the aid process. When local
families chose not to send their children to the YLOODJH¶VFKXUFK-run schools, those 16 families
³facing the boycott were deprived of the NGO largHVVHURXWHGWKURXJKWKHFKXUFK´
(Newindpress.com, 1 May 2006). What systematic role institutions like the uur panchayat and
parish councils played in the process of recovery is a critical question to which the article now
turns.

Data and Methodology
This article uses data gathered from site visits by the author to affected communities in
Tamil Nadu, India, observations of post-tsunami recovery levels, interviews with survivors and
NGOs, and extensive secondary and tertiary materials (including evaluations of the recovery
carried out by local social service providers, grey materials from NGOs and government
agencies which provided post-tsunami services, and local newspaper and wire service accounts
of the recovery, translated from Hindi and Tamil when necessary). In early 2008 I visited five
villages (and two cities2) in southeast India affected by the tsunami and interviewed 27 survivors,
14
  

NGO leaders, activists, and disaster scholars with the assistance of a translator using open-ended
questions about their experiences; I used secondary and tertiary materials (as detailed above) to
study the sixth village. I provide details on the gender, position, and location of these informants
in Table 2.
[Table 2 about here]
Roughly one-third of my informants were women, and four-fifths were local residents; our
discussions lasted between 30 and 45 minutes each, on average. Additionally, I was provided
access to 80 anonymized cases of hour-or-longer interviews with local survivors collected by
Indian social service agencies after the tsunami. These transcribed interviews provided
additional information about the day-to-day recovery process and broadened my understanding
of the role of social resources in rehabilitation.
I deliberately selected these six villages because of the variation in both levels of social
capital and recovery through a selection process known as choice-based sampling method (see
King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, sec. 4.4.2). I chose these villages after consultation with local
NGO and relief agency leaders working in the area who provided their expert insights into the
range of outcomes and village characteristics. Table 3 below describes basic characteristics of
the six villages under direct study here; communities with a higher percentage of their families in
new or repaired housing, whose survivors self-reported positive recoveries, and which were
labeled by local agencies as doing well were categorized as KDYLQJ³JRRG´UHFRYHU\RXWFRPHV
Alternatively, those communities with greater numbers of survivors who remained in temporary
shelters, a smaller percentage of their community in rebuilt or new housing, more self-reports of
obstacles to recovery, and which were seen by experts as not recovering well were categorized as
KDYLQJ³SRRU´RXWFRPHV. These six villages do not serve as a sample of the entire universe of
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cases; rather, case studies of their recoveries can help develop and probe new hypotheses about
the relationships between social capital and post-disaster recovery.
[Table 3 about here]
These six villages are located in the state of Tamil Nadu (India has 28 states) and within the
district of Nagapattinam (Tamil Nadu is divided into 32 districts), located on the southeast coast
of India. Tamil Nadu has grown more slowly than most other Indian states over the past decade
but has displayed higher than average levels of population density and urbanization. Its overall
literacy rates climbed from two-thirds in 1991 to almost three-quarters by 2001 and it has been a
OHDGHULQGLJLWL]LQJODQGUHFRUGVDQGLQVWLWXWLQJ³(-JRYHUQDQFH´in which government services
can be access through the internet (REDS 2006: 30). For the district of Nagapattinam,
population density (based on the 2001 census, which is the most recent available data) was 520
people per square kilometer in rural areas, 700 people per square kilometers in fishing hamlets,
and 1720 people per square kilometer in rural ones.
This article employs qualitative methodology to make replicable inferences (King,
Keohane, Verba 1994) about the relationship between social capital and the levels of postdisaster recovery. I use side-by-side case studies to tease out underlying causal mechanisms
(George and Bennett 2004). Process tracing ± like its quantitative counterparts ± relies on
within-and across-case covariational evidence (Gerring 2004) to better illuminate the role of
relevant factors. A solid research design requires variation in both independent and dependent
variables, and the villages under study had both varying levels of social capital (as indicated by
the presence or absence of an uur panchayat ) and recovery outcomes (determined by quality of
housing and self- and external-reports on the recovery process).
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C ase Studies of V illages with Strong Bonding and L inking Social C apital
In hamlets 1, 3, 4, and 5 parish councils and uur panchayats (caste councils) dominate the
social order, as they do in many other fishing villages in coastal Tamil Nadu (Gill 2007: 22).
These non-state organizations connect same-caste residents in one industry ± Catholics who
work in sea-related industries for parish councils in the south and Pattinvars3 who are fishers for

uur panchayats in the southeast ± to each other, reinforcing existing bonding social capital in
these localities. Many coastal villages in Tamil Nadu are highly homogeneous, with Pattinavar
fishing families making up 90 percent of the population and the remainder of the families
coming from Dalits4 and various other castes (Bavinck 2008: 79; Sharma 2005: 4). Ties between
members of the fishing communities are strengthened due to shared caste and kinship groupings;
PHPEHUVRIWKHFRPPXQLW\ZKRPDUU\RXWVLGHWKHLUFDVWH³can be severely punished with
ostracism by the community´ *RPDWK\006c: 218).
Parish councils and uur panchayats serve both as informal law and norm enforcers and as
common pool resources (CPR) managers (Ostrom 1990; Salagrama 2006: 76; Bavinck 2008: 81).
These councils maintain gramakattupadu (discipline in the village) (Gomathy 2006b) through
dispute resolution and the managing of religious events. In the past, councils engaged in hard
and soft social control mechanisms (Aldrich 2008) through social pressure, fines, and ostracism
(known as mariyal), but presently ³many of the villages restrict themselves to fining´ (Gomathy
2006c: 221). More broadly, a council ³maintains community structure, rituals, village
membership, resource GLVWULEXWLRQGLVSHQVLQJRIMXVWLFHDQGJULHYDQFHUHGUHVVDO´ (Rodriguez,
Balasubramanian, Shiny, Duraiswamy and Jaiprakash 2008: 11; see also Gomathy 2006c: 219).
The distribution of shared supplies to members during the rainy season when fishing catches
typically ran low (Bavinck 2008: 82) provides a typical example of their coordinated collective
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action. These councils which initially reified ³ERQGLQJ´social capital (that is, assisting in-group
members) came to serve more as ³links´with outside agencies after the tsunami. Before the
tsunami, fishing communities were said to lack connections to DQGDZDUHQHVVRIWKH³ODUJHU
ZRUOG´ 6DODJUDPD ± that is, many had small amounts of linking social capital - but
the disaster brought them new roles as bridges to external aid organizations and the government.
The 2004 tsunami transformed these institutions into critical gatekeepers for aid
distribution, as the government of India relied heavily on these councils during the relief period.
Government and NGO decision makers saw local councils as ³the only institution that can
provide continuity, growth and indeed sustenance to the process of redevelopment initiated in the
YLOODJHV´ (South Asia Regional Knowledge Platform 2005: 7). Neither the government of India
nor the NGOs involved in recovery could survey or interview every villager about his or her
needsVRWKH\UHOLHGRQ³lists prepared by fisher panchayat [that is, uur panchayat] OHDGHUV´
(REDS 2006: 15) to appraise damage levels. ³,QPDQ\FDVHV[uur panchayats] acted as a onestop shop for the rehabilitation agencies (both Government and NGOs) to channel support into
WKHFRPPXQLWLHV´ (ICSF 2006: 206). Thus villages 1, 3, 4, and 5 held stronger levels of linking
social capital than hamlets without these governing bodies, and these ties provided survivors
with connections to NGOs and the government post-tsunami.
Once the hamlet and parish councils assessed the destruction and provided this
information to the government of India and to NGOs, they stored all of the incoming aid. Rather
than disbursing supplies as they came in, many uur panchayats sought to create an equitable
distribution system for their recognized members (Author interviews, 2008; Gomathy 2006). ³If
the organization could dispense enough relief to all the members, distribution followed.
Otherwise they were asked to deposit the materials till more were collected, in order that they
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could be distributed to all members of the community.´ *RPDWK\F For example, in
one village the FRXQFLO³collect[ed] all boats that are given by the NGOs as well. These boats
[we]re then sold to those who can buy them, with the rest of the money being distributed among
other community memberV´ 7DWD,QVWLWXWH  Individuals or families within the village
refusing to conform to these procedures found themselves facing social control mechanisms.
³)LYHILVKLQJIDPLOLHVZKRKDGµUHIXVHGWRVXUUHQGHUWRWKHSDQFKD\DWWKHFDVKDQGPDWHULDO
relief they received from various service organizations,¶ were excommunicated by the uur

panchayat´ (Bavinck 2008: 88).
While the strong social ties embedded in these organizations allowed them to overcome
collective action problems and speed up the recovery of their members, those ties also made it
difficult ± if not impossible ± for groups such as Dalit, women, and the elderly to receive aid or
participate in the process. Because the uur panchayats and parish councils created the lists of
families requiring assistance, they could easily exclude ± deliberately or because of unintentional
oversight ± nonmember families considered unwRUWK\RIDLG³>7KHSDQFKD\DW@identified all
beneficiaries but in some cases they excluded those in conflict with the panchayat along with
RXWFDVWHV´ ,QWHUYLHZ 7, 21 February 2008). Women ± especially women who headed
households - and Dalit had never been formal members of uur panchayats before the disaster
(Gomathy 2006c: 224; see also Sharma 2005: 4; Martin 2005: 44) and the process of recovery
highlighted cultural barriers for them and other subgroups, including tribal communities
(adivasi), single or widowed women, and the elderly (United Nations, World Bank, and Asian
Development Bank 2006: 16; Menon 2007: 6). This may have been because the panchayats
³RIWHQRSHUDWHGXQGHUWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDWVLQJOHDQGHOGHUO\ZRPHQDUHWDNHQFDUHRIE\WKHLU
faPLO\PHPEHUVDQGKHQFHGRQRWUHTXLUHUDWLRQ>VLF@LQWKHLURZQULJKW´ 3LQFKD 
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These villages ± 1, 3, 4, and 5 ± would inhabit the bottom, right-hand box in Table 1, holding
high levels of both bonding and linking social capital. While their overall recoveries were rated
as ³good, ³minorities within these villages reported the greatest amount of discrimination and
exclusion from the recovery process. I now turn to investigate villages which lacked
institutionalized bonding and linking capital to investigate their post-tsunami recovery.
C ase Studies of V illages with Low L evels of Bonding and L inking Social C apital
While villages 2 and 6 lacked uur panchayat or parish councils and had poorer recovery
outcomes in terms of housing and aid receipt, they also had almost no recorded cases of
exclusion or discrimination (Interviews with residents, February 2008). In such communities,
³[e]xistence depends on the ingenuity of women, mutual support within extended families, and
minimal income derived fURPLQWHUPLWWHQWLQIRUPDOVHFWRUMREV´ %XQFK)UDQNOLQ0RUOHy,
Kumaran, and Suresh 2005: 3). Residents which lack a governing caste council must rely solely
on existing, often kin-based bonding social capital during the post-crisis period, as they lack
linking capital which could connect them to NGOs or government representatives. As many
scholars of social networks have pointed out, for underdeveloped regions and for individuals of
ORZVRFLRHFRQRPLFVWDWXVERQGLQJVRFLDOFDSLWDODOORZVWKHPWR³JHWE\´EXWZLWKRXW
connections to extra-local organizations they KDYHGLIILFXOW\³JHWWLQJDKHDG´ see Woolcock and
Narayan 2000 for an extended discussion).
These isolated villages did not connect to the government of India or to local or
international nongovernmental organizations in the post-tsunami recovery process. One village ±
which I have labeled as Village 6 ± lacked a caste council and was unable to collectively
mobilize and extract resources from the outside agencies after the tsunami. Lacking communal
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leadership and contacts with the broader relief world, the village was left out of the rehabilitation
process. Unlike other communities which could engage in collective action, ³[n]o communal
strategies were employed´ in ³propagating an image of a wreckHGDQGDIIHFWHGWVXQDPLYLOODJH´
DQG³no efforts were made to contact any outside aid RUJDQL]DWLRQVDQGDVNIRUKHOS´(Mercks
2007: 39-40). Instead, residents in village 6 were forced to rely on family members for
assistance and literally were not on the maps of relief providers; a local NGO eventually came on
the scene and tried to assist them (long after the recovery had started for other hamlets). This is
in strong contrast to the successful ability of hamlets (described above) which self-organized to
bring in external assistance.
Village 2 ± which, like its caste-council-governed counterparts, suffered heavy damage
from the tsunami ± also lacked an organizing caste or parish council before the disaster.
Attempts to interface with outsiders both domestic and international floundered and survivors
could rely only on kinship ties and bonding social capital to find assistance. Its process of
recovery, then, did not favor one caste group, gender, or demographic over the other, but it also
lacked the resources flowing into better-connected communities. Some of the residents
recognized that their recovery had been compromised due to a lack of connections and social
capital. As one survivor in the village WROGPH³:HDUH[now] planning to make a panFKD\DW«,
EHOLHYHWKDWSHRSOHZLWKSDQFKD\DWVUHFHLYHGPRUHEHQHILWVEHFDXVHWKH\ZHUHEHWWHURUJDQL]HG´
(Interview 11, 19 February 2008). These two villages ± Village 2 and Village 6 - would sit in the
upper, right-hand box of Table 1; their caste homogeneity and strong support networks involve a
great deal of bonding social capital, but they lacked connections to extra-local agencies.
Finally, one scholar described poorer post-tsunami outcomes for heterogeneous fishing
communities in Tamil Nadu± hamlets which lacked both bonding and linking social capital.
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Without coordinating mechanisms such as parish or hamlet councils, WKLV³SUHFOXGHG their
coming together for collective and effectiYHDUWLFXODWLRQRIWKHLUYLHZV´(Salagrama 2006: 60).
Such villages ± lacking both bonding and linking social capital ± would reside in the upper, lefthand box of Table 1. For residents and survivors of these villages, while everyone has received
the same treatment and discrimination has been absent, recovery has been slower and impeded
by a lack of external connections and resources.
Presentation of F indings
As past studies have argued, higher levels of social capital in tsunami-affected villages in
Tamil Nadu provided resources for a faster and more efficient recovery (Nakagawa and Shaw
2004; Dynes 2005; Adger et al. 2005; Tatsuki 2008). However, these past studies have
overlooked a critical point: whereas institutionalized bodies of strong bonding and linking social
capital ± such as uur panchayats ± sped up the recovery for their members, they simultaneously
slowed it down for outsiders and those on the margins of society. Strong social capital brought
with it a number of benefits, including more robust mental health outcomes and greater access to
logistical and financial resources for survivors. The strong local institutions of caste and parish
councils served as focal points and mediators with the aid community during the relief efforts,
ensuring that in-group members received aid. Social capital reduced the need for counseling and
external intervention post disaster (Gupta and Sharma 2006: 74) and social support systems such as extended and joint families- ³contribute[d] WRWKHFRPPXQLW\¶VUHVLOLHQFH´ 0HKWD2007).
Further, the weak ties (Granovetter 1973) which extended outside affected communities provided
up to one-third of the financial assistance delivered to tsunami-affected households (Nidhiprabha
2007: 26). Scholars must now begin to recognize that ± at least in the case of Tamil Nadu
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villages after the tsunami - these benefits come with exclusion of outsiders, such as widows,
Dalit, Muslims, the elderly, non-Christians and migrants. Especially in societies where racism,
caste discrimination, and other forms of social persecution persist, such governance institutions
may bring negative externalities. This ³GRXEOH-HGJHG´ $OGULFKDQG&URRN RU³-DQXVIDFHG´ 6]UHWHU QDWXUHRIVRFLDOFDSLWDOLQSRVW-disaster situations must be recognized in
future scholarship.
Finally, in terms of potential methodological pitfalls of the current article, while the
sample size of villages in this study has been quite small, and these hamlets do not constitute a
random or representative sample, the findings from these hamlets have been corroborated by
larger studies of Tamil Nadu hamlets (Louis 2005). That is, scholars have uncovered similar
relationships between strong social capital and negative outcomes in other studies of post-crisis
recovery in southeast India (Gill 2007). Recent scholarship on post-Hurricane Katrina recovery
in New Orleans has similarly shown that communities with both local bonding and extra-local
bridging/linking social capital demonstrated more resilience than those neighborhoods solely
with bonding ties (Elliott, Haney, Sams-Abiodun 2010).
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
Villages and hamlets in Nagapattinam with both bonding and linking social networks
fared better than those solely with bonding connections (cf. Woolcock and Narayan 2000), but
such localities practiced discrimination with some regularity. Whether in pre-Nazi Germany
(Berman 1997), early 21st century Thailand (Callahan 2005), or post-Katrina New Orleans
(Aldrich and Crook 2008), strong social capital has often been accompanied by costs, especially
for out-group residents and nonmembers. Future research should seek to investigate the
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externalities of social capital in post-disaster situations in multiple contexts and time periods.
Given the regularity of disasters, and predictions that their destruction of lives and property will
only continue to grow (Hoyois, Below, Scheuren, and Guha-Sapir 2007), disaster research
remains a critical focus for social science. C. Wright Mills (1959) pointed out that social science
provides individuals with mastery over an increasingly complex world, and a better
understanding of the recovery process would provide survivors and policy makers alike with
³XVDEOHNQRZOHGJH´- knowledge that is both accurate and politically tractable (Haas 2004: 572).
With the ubiquity of disasters and the certainty that coastal communities around the world will
be experiencing the consequences of global warming in the near future, as scholars we have an
obligation to better understand the factors which can expedite or block efficient and equitable
recovery.
Despite the dawning recognition of the importance of social capital in mitigating the
effect of disasters (Hutton 2001; Mathbor 2007), standard post-disaster aid procedures continue
to focus primarily on restoring physical infrastructure damaged by the disaster. For example,
when discussing the grants and loans provided to Indian coastal communities, the United Nations,
World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank (2006: 26) argued that ³'XULQJGLVDVWHUVLWXDWLRQV
roads and bridges serve as links not only for launching rescue and transporting for relief and
rehabilitation, but also as escape routes. Therefore, the criticality of roads and bridges is
indisputable.´ As an afterthought, these organizations acknowledged that community level
social workers should encourage victims to participate in community events (2006: 34) to help
them rebuild their social networks. Social, not physical, infrastructure should be a mainstay in
disaster mitigation and recovery policies.
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Next, this article has sought to correct a naïve conception of social infrastructure in which
social capital enhances resilience without bringing harm (cf. Adger et al 2005). Observers
envisioned the high cohesion within South Asian fishing communities as a symbol of ³strong
sense of camaraderie and community membership among the individuals residing in the same
area´WKDWOHDGVWR³altruistic behavior´(Rodriguez, Wachtendorf, Kendra, and Trainor 2006:
173). However, Wetterberg pointed out that ( ³VRFLDOFDSLWDOPXVWEHWKRught of as a
potential source of benefits, rather than the benefits themselves,´ and this article would further
amend our understanding so that social capital needs to be seen as potential source of both
benefits and costs.
Finally, policy makers should first ensure that recovery and rehabilitation plans do not
destroy existing social capital through resettlement processes. As mentioned earlier, posttsunami evacuation regularly placed survivors far from their family, friends, and social networks.
If possible, disaster planners should evacuate people in socially intact groups or at least
reassemble evacuees in intact communities. Local residents themselves recognized the benefits
of maintaining and strengthening networks after the tsunami. In one study, an older woman
UHSRUWHGWKDW³>P@any people in this camp are from the same street and village in which I live and
we all help each other´ (Help Age International 2005: 12). Some self-organized in their
HYDFXDWLRQVRWKDW³>S@ost tsunami, all the members of one village decided to stay together in the
temporary sheds in a gesture of unity, especially to support people who have lost their dear ones´
(Gomathy 2006c: 218)7KHVHVXUYLYRUVLQWXLWLYHO\UHFRJQL]HGWKDW³>Z@omen who are able to
access familiar religious sites, markets, hospitals, relatives, friends and other resources will be
far less vulnerable to abuse, exploitation and psychological distress´ (Banerjee and Chaudhury
2005)
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A second goal for disaster planners should be to consider how to expand both bonding
and linking social capital so as include excluded groups and develop outreach skills for these
peripheral residents at the same time (Elliott, Haney, Abiodun 2010). Initial signs indicate that
this may be happening. The Mumbai-based Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS) has
developed a leadership seminar to increase the mobilization capacity of indigenous groups and
tribal peoples in India to better connect with outside communities. Through such programs
otherwise insular groups may develop new linking social capital which puts them in touch with
new resources and organizations. Local NGOs, such as the National Council of YMCAs of India,
has begun providing training to women to expand livelihood options including matt weaving and
diamond polishing (Site Visit, 19 February 2008). These new skill sets and new government
regulations requiring the names of both husband and wife on land titles will provide women
additional leverage to push for broader participation both in political and economic spheres.
Public policy should ensure that wherever possible, societies work to build up the bonding and
linking social networks of vulnerable communities to ensure that they will be better positioned
against future disasters.
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Table 1: Interaction between Bonding and Linking Social Capital, with Examples

Low Bonding Social Capital

High Bonding Social Capital

Low Linking Social Capital

Heterogeneous coastal
villages without uur
panchayats

Homogeneous Dalit villages

High Linking Social Capital

[No applicable case]

Uur panchayat-led villages
with links to outside agencies

32
  

Table 2: Details on Informants
Interview  
Number  

Gender  

Position  

Location  

1  

Male  

Resident  

Village  1  

2  

Female  

Widowed  survivor  

Village  1  

3  

Male  

Resident  

Village  1  

4  

Male  

Local  activist  

City  1  

5  

Male  

Resident  

Village  2  

6  

Female  

Resident  

Village  2  

7  

Female  

NGO  Leader  

City  1  

8  

Female  

Resident  

Village  2  

9  

Female  

Resident  

Village  3  

10  

Male  

NGO  Leader  

City  1  

11  

Male  

Resident  

Village  2  

12  

Male  

NGO  Leader  

City  1  

13  

Female  

Widowed  resident  

Village  3  

14  

Female  

Resident  

Village  2  

15  

Female  

Wife  of  village  head  

Village  5  

16  

Male  

Disaster  scholar  

City  2  

17  

Male  

Local  activist  

Village  4  

18  

Male  

Resident  

Village  4  

19  

Male  

Local  activist  

City  1  

20  

Male  

Resident  

Village  1  

21  

Male  

Disaster  scholar  

City  2  

22  

Female  

Resident  

Village  1  

23  

Male  

Fisher  

Village  1  

24  

Male  

Scholar  

City  1  

25  

Male  

Resident  

Village  1  

26  

Male  

Resident  

Village  1  

27  

Female  

Resident  

Village  1  
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Table 3: Summary of Village Characteristics
Village  Designation  

Hamlet  /  parish  council  

Level  of  damage  

Recovery  Outcome  

1  

Yes  

High  

Good  

2  

No  

High  

Poor  

3  

Yes  

Moderate  

Good  

4  

Yes  

High  

Good  

5  

Yes  

Moderate  

Good  

6  

No  

High  

Poor  

  
                                                                                                                      
1

I use the words hamlet and village interchangeably through the article. Typical villages in Tamil Nadu hold
between 200 and 1200 people (Bavinck 2001); hamlets of this size are classified by the government of India census
as Class VI villages.
2
I traveled to the urban areas to meet with several NGO leaders and scholars who worked with tsunami-affected
residents in villages in rural Tamil Nadu but had offices in nearby cities; these cities themselves are not the focus of
the study.
3
Communities where fishing is the core livelihood will elevate the caste of that demographic above other normally
³KLJKHUFDVWHV´³7KXVLQDILVKLQJFRPPXQLW\LWLVWKH3DWWLQDYDUVZKRZRXOGEHWKHGRPLQDQWFDVWHDOWKRXJKWKH
same village might have representatives of the KLJKHUFDVWHVOLNH%UDKPLQV´ 9HQNDWHVK6DODJUDPDSHUVRQDO
communication 7/29/09). See also Srinivas (1987) for a full discussion of this phenemenon.
4
$IXOOGHVFULSWLRQRI,QGLD¶VFDVWHV\VWHPLVEH\RQGWKHVFRSHRIWKLVDUWLFOHEXWEURDGO\'DOLWVVtand outside the
standard four-WLHUFDVWHV\VWHP7KH\FDQQRWPDUU\WKRVHZLWKLQWKHV\VWHPDQG³DUHFRQVLGHUHGVSLULWXDOO\DQG
physically unclean, and in the caste system must live in a separate colony, must use separate water and eating
facilities, must never come in contact with caste Hindus, must call out an identifying greeting to ensure everyone
NQRZVWKH\DUHµXQWRXFKDEOH¶DQGPXVWSHUIRUPWKHWDVNVFRQVLGHUHGWRRXQFOHDQIRUFDVWH+LQGXVWRGR7KHVHMREV
included removing carcasses of dead animals, working with leather, performing midwifery duties, cleaning toilets,
JLYLQJQHZVRIGHDWKDQGZRUNLQJZLWKSDUWLFXODUPHWDOV´ *LOO 6HH0LQHV  IRUDIXOOGHVFULSWLRQRI
jati (caste) in historical and social context.  
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